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ON DRUGS IN BOLIVIA
Jaime Malamud-Goti*
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, opinions vary regarding the government's con-
duct of the war on drugs. While most scholars focus primarily on eco-
nomic, civil libertarian, and international relations issues, government
officials concentrate on different aspects of the war. One area on which
United States politicians focus a great deal of attention is the drug
trade in South American countries. While American efforts to slow the
drug trade in some areas have met with some success, the American
strategy in Bolivia has been a complete failure." Many United States
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by the Harry & Frank Guggenheim Foundation.
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dence in my work and supplied me with valuable opinions on the drug trade and other
international issues. I also thank Ruti Teitel, who patiently went through a draft of this
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Crandon, who has made not only my English, but also my general thoughts,
intelligible.
1. See Margolis, Bolivian Army Carries Drug War to Hills; Peasant Beneficiaries
of Trafficking Skeptical of U.S.-Aided Efforts, Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 1984, at A17
[hereinafter Bolivian Army Carries Drug War to Hills] (noting that Bolivia produces
approximately half the world's supply of cocaine and that all efforts to control drug
production had failed). Coca was grown and used in Bolivia for religious and medicinal
purposes even before the time of the Incas. Id. at A22. The indigenous population of
Bolivia continues to use it for these purposes today. Id. Growing and selling coca leaves
for these purposes is legal. Id.
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politicians, however, overlook the failures of the current strategy and
advocate increased resources to further that strategy. They believe that
better training for enforcement officers, a stepped-up United States
military presence, and tougher controls against corruption will ulti-
mately resolve the drug problem. Although there are many problems
with the war on drugs in Bolivia, they cannot be attributed merely to
insufficient resources. These problems, rather, indicate that current
drug eradication programs are improperly planned and executed.
A brief review of the United States' strategy to address the drug
trade in Bolivia raises questions about the fundamental assumptions
under which it operates. U.S. politicians have a tendency to oversim-
plify the motives, interests, and beliefs of the parties involved in the
conflict at the local level. United States policy makers initially catego-
rized members of the drug trade into three artificial and oversimplified
groups: (1) the Bolivian government, including the police and military,
which supposedly intended to eradicate coca production and cocaine
trafficking; (2) the cocaine traffickers, financiers, dealers, and couriers;
and (3) the campesino coca growers, a poor group of nearly 400,000
people2 who require protection in their struggle to survive. This charac-
terization is fatally flawed, however, because it does not account for the
substantial diversity of individuals and the multiplicity of interests in-
volved in the Bolivian drug trade. Bolivia's failure to control the pre-
dominant drug activity that undermines its economy and institutions is
the result of economic, 3 political,4 and ideological factors. Furthermore,
2. Coca Eradicatiorn Real Possibility or Fantasy?, ANDEAN Focus, June 1988, at
2 [hereinafter Coca Eradication]. Campesinos are indigenous to Bolivia. They inhabit
the high valleys and the Altiplano. The majority of campesinos in Bolivia are Quechua
and Aymara. Most lived on a subsistence agricultural economy until they moved into
the Chapare province, in the region of Cochabamba.
3. See Bolivian Army Carries Drug War to Hills, supra note 1, at A22 (comparing
the economic benefits of growing coca and other crops). Peasants harvest coca leaves
three or four times a year. Id. Other crops, such as oranges and coffee, can only be
harvested once a year. Id. As a result of farmers concentrating on growing coca, parts
of Bolivia have had to import foodstuffs to feed their own populations. Id. Residents of
the Chapare must truck in rice, vegetables, and flour from markets in Cochabamba,
Santa Cruz, and La Paz. Id.
4. Craig, Illicit Drug Traffic and U.S.-Latin American Relations, 8 WASH. Q. 105,
105 (1985). The political instability, widespread corruption, and bureaucratic inepti-
tude that plague Bolivian political life make consistent enforcement of the drug control
laws impossible. Id. at 107. There have been over 180 military coups in Bolivia in 150
years. See Bolivian President is Kidnapped, Then Freed, in an Aborted Coup, N.Y.
Times, July 1, 1984, at 8 [hereinafter Bolivian President is Kidnapped] (discussing
Bolivia's political history in light of the abduction of President Siles-Suazo).
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the Bolivian state's lack of coercive power and the multiple interests
involved in the drug trade make the war approach impractical at best.
The very essence of the current war on drugs ignores the compli-
cated, conflicting interests involved in the Bolivian situation. These in-
terests range from the mutual antagonism born from a diversity of cul-
tures, and the conflicting ambitions of over fifty sectoral political
parties, to the vulnerability of the centralized state, and partisan poli-
cies and privileges. The history of drug enforcement in post-dictatorial
Bolivia demonstrates the complexity of the players and interests in-
volved and the corresponding defects in the American characterization.
This failure to correctly assess the situation in Bolivia has resulted in
the failure of almost every attempt to attack and curb illicit drug pro-
duction and distribution. These attempts will continue to fail until pol-
icy makers recognize the intricacy of Bolivian politics, repeal detrimen-
tal drug legislation, and devise realistic policies to work within the
complex Bolivian social and political systems.
I. DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN POST-DICTATORIAL
BOLIVIA
Hernan Siles-Suazo, the first democratically elected president of Bo-
livia in eighteen years, held office from 1982 through 1985.0 During
this period Bolivian policies regarding coca and cocaine production var-
ied from a laissez-faire approach to major enforcement campaigns us-
ing the army7 and foreign troops.8 Drastic measures that earned foreign
approval were severely criticized domestically by peasants, political
parties, trade unions, and factions within the military. The United
States pressured Siles to adopt drastic measures designed to substan-
tially reduce coca production and cocaine traffic in his country. The
5. See Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism: The Case of Bolivia, in Au-
THORITARIANISM AND CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERI A 459 (1979) (noting that Bo-
livia's economy is affected by other industrialized nations, and, as a result, political
decisions are often based on relationships with those countries rather than on the needs
of Bolivia).
6. Hernan Siles-Suazo, along with Victor Paz-Estenssoro, gained notoriety after en-
gineering the 1952 revolution that brought about critical shifts in the balance of power
in Bolivia through measures such as the agrarian reform of 1953.
7. Heires, U.S. Losing War Against Cocaine Mafias, Latinamerica Press, Dec. 20,
1984, at 1 [hereinafter U.S. Losing War].
8. Operation Blast Furnace, Report of Commanders Jorge Vazquez and Ricardo
Lopez 1988 (available in the archives of Gendarameria Naclonal Argentina).
9. Interview with Roger Cortez, in La Paz (Jan. 11, 1990). Cortez investigated the
incident first hand. See also Guillermo Bedregal Gutierrez and Buddy Bizcarra Pando,
LA LucHA BOLiVIANA CoNTRA LA AGRESION DEL NARCOTRAFICO (1989) [hereinafter
LA LucHA BotvIANA].
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extent and complexity of the Bolivian cocaine economy,10 however,
made it impossible for him to meet the U.S. demands."1 Siles believed
that staging a major repressive campaign against the drug business at
the beginning of his presidency would endanger the stability of his ad-
ministration. The president's decision was influenced by the well-known
involvement of highly ranked military and police officers in the drug
trade during the Garcia-Meza regime,1 2 as well as the potential inabil-
ity of the fledgling democratic institutions to control the armed forces.
In August 1983, as pressure from the United States increased, the
Bolivian government finally agreed to destroy 4,000 hectares of coca. 3
The United States and Bolivian governments created a special anti-
drug police force, the Mobil Unit of Rural Patrol (UMOPAR). The
purpose of this group, known as the Leopardos, was to destroy the coca
crops over a period of four years.1 4 United States State Department
officials described this new special police branch as a "paramilitary
group." 15 The two governments designed the UMOPAR to be an elite
force, and chose its members from among the most skilled law enforce-
ment officers in Bolivia. United States forces specially trained the
UMOPAR troops in jungle warfare to enable them to fight drug traffic
and production more efficiently.
16
The UMOPAR, however, did not confine its efforts to policing drug
traffic. Three high-ranking UMOPAR officers, German Linares, Carlos
Barriga, and Julio Vargas, led members of the UMOPAR and Bolivian
army troops in a coup attempt on June 30, 1984.17 In the course of the
takeover, UMOPAR Second Commander Linares and Colonel Mario-
Rolan Anaya, Vice-President Paz-Estenssoro's army aide, abducted
10. See Coca Eradication, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing the impact of the drug
trade on the Bolivian economy). Coca eradication is particularly difficult in Bolivia
because of the existence of a large and powerful growers union. Id. One authority esti-
mated that a comprehensive effort to eliminate the coca trade and protect the Bolivian
economy would require approximately $1 billion per year. Id.
11. See id. (noting that the impetus for change is more likely to come from the
U.S. government than from the Bolivian government because of Bolivia's economic de-
pendence on coca).
12. See J. DUNKERLEY, REBELLION IN THE VEINS 328-29 (1984) (discussing the
reign of the Garcia-Meza regime from 1980-81).
13. See generally Van Wert, The US State Department's Narcotics Control Policy
in the Americas, 30 J. INTERAMERICAN STUDIES & WORLD Am. 1, 15 (1988) (discuss-
ing the seizures of labs, interdiction of drug shipments, and the creation and training of





17. Vega, Bolivia: U.S. Presses Siles to Curb Drug Trade, Latinamerica Press,
July 26, 1984, at I [hereinafter U.S. Presses Siles].
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President Siles-Suazo.1 8 Ultimately, Suies was able to negotiate his
freedom, and the plotters of the coup were forced into exile in the Ar-
gentine Embassy,19 but the incident dramatized the extent to which the
drug trade continued to control Bolivian political life.20 It also empha-
sized the threat to the democratic experiment in Bolivia if the Le-
opardos gained the support of the Bolivian army.21
A. THE 1984 CHAPARE OFFENSIVE
United States policy makers did not understand the fragility of the
new Bolivian democracy, even in the wake of the abduction of Siles.
United States Senator Paula Hawkins, a member of the Sub-Commit-
tee on Drug Abuse and Narcotics of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources, complained that the newly elected democratic
administration had progressed too slowly in curtailing the cocaine
trade. On a visit to La Paz, Bolivia on July 8, 1984, shortly after Sues'
release, Senator Hawkins warned that the United States would with-
hold $58 million in aid unless Bolivia instituted significant measures to
curb the drug trade.2 In response, the Siles administration attempted
to change its image by placing Bolivia's Chapare 3 province under mili-
18. Interview with Enrique Valverde, in Chapare (May 26, 1990). While Linares,
Barriga, and Vargas spearheaded the main force, UMOPAR Captain Ciro Gigena oc-
cupied the Ministry of the Interior. Id.
19. Id. President Siles-Suazo was successful, at least in part, because a large sector
of the army opposed the coup. Id. See also Bolivian President is Kidnapped, supra
note 4, at 1 (discussing the abduction and release of President Siles-Suazo).
20. See J. DuNKERLEY, supra note 12, at 328-29 (describing the influence of drug
interests during the Garcia-Meza regime). Garcia-Meza's dictatorship was also know
as the "cocaine dictatorship" because of the government's involvement in the drug
trade. During one year of bloody rule, the organizers of the drug traffic were Interior
Minister Luis Arce-Gomez and his cousin, Roberto Suarez-Gomez. Suarez was a
rancher from the Beni and one of the most powerful cocaine traders in the country
until he surrendered in July 1988, for reasons that remain unclear.
21. U.S. Presses Siles, supra note 17, at 2. Victor Paz-Estenssoro shared the lead-
ership of the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionarlo (MNR). Paz-Estenssoro served two
terms as president of Bolivia in the 1950's and was succeeded by Hernan Siles-Suazo.
Paz-Estenssoro was elected president for a third term in 1985, this time succeeding
Siles-Suazo. Paz-Estenssoro reinstated Linares, the former rebel officer, despite his
awareness of the danger the Leopardos could pose when they combined with the army.
Linares' reinstatement demonstrated the new government's need to negotiate with the
powerful drug interests in order to survive and the fragility of democracy in Bolivia. It
may be presumed that this reinstatement was the consequence of the pressure exerted
on Paz by sectors of the police and the armed forces. Only such pressure could explain
the reappointment in light of the political affinities between Siles-Suazo and Paz-
Estenssoro.
22. Id. at 1. Senator Hawkins further commented that the drug trade represented a
significant threat to democratic institutions. Id.
23. U.S. Losing War, supra note 7, at 2. The Chapare province sits within the
province of Cochabamba, approximately 180 miles east of La Paz and 100 miles north
1990]
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tary control. The government also staged a joint anti-drug operation
with 1,500 army troops and UMOPAR policemen.2
The Chapare Offensive destroyed several million dollars worth of
coca paste and led to the confiscation of several airplanes and weap-
ons.25 It also resulted in the arrest of some small drug traffickers, a few
medium sized dealers, and nearly fifty "stompers," who process cocaine
paste with their feet.2" The larger drug traffickers, however, had several
days advance notice of the raid and escaped before the troops stormed
the region.
The Chapare Offensive created a great deal of unrest among the
peasants. Peasant union organizers feared their coca crops would be the
army's next target and mobilized 5,000 growers, on October 29, 1984,
to blockade the major roads in the Chapare.28 The unions lifted their
siege only after the government promised not to destroy their coca
crops. 9 To further ensure the safety of their plantations, however,
these growers subsequently staged a hunger strike, demanding that the
government withdraw the troops from the region and issue licenses to
the peasants so they might continue cultivating and marketing their
of the city of Cochabamba. Formally, the province stretches from the top of the moun-
tain chain that stands north of Cochabamba to the high chain that separates the city
from the rain forest that spreads to the northern border with amazonian Brazil. Tech-
nically, the Chapare ends 100 miles north of the city of Cochabamba, at the foot of the
mountains. In ordinary parlance, however, the Chapare encompasses the jungle areas
of the provinces of Carrasco and Tiraque, and borders with the regions of Santa Cruz
de la Sierra on the east and Isiboro Secure on the north.
24. Id. United States Ambassador Edwin Corr welcomed the initiative but denied
any relationship between the operation and United States pressure on Bolivia. Id. Corr
did confirm, however, that the United States planned to give $58 million in aid to
Bolivia. Id. Observers have speculated that the funds would not be blocked because
there are issues more important to U.S. and Bolivian leaders than the drug problem.
See Craig, supra note 4, at 108 (discussing Bolivian and U.S. efforts at drug control
and speculating that Washington will not terminate aid to Bolivia).
25. U.S. Losing War, supra note 7, at 2.
26. See Healey, Coca, the State, and the Peasantry in Bolivia, 30 J. OF INTER-
AMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFF. 105, 112 (1988) (discussing results of the
Chapare Offensive); Government Against Herbicides in Coca Eradication (Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, June 17, 1988).
27. U.S. Losing War, supra note 7, at 2. The government announced that the raid
would take place, but waited several days before beginning the operation. Id. This lapse
allowed 20,000 drug dealers to escape from the area. Id.
28. LA LucsH BOLIVIANA, supra note 9, at 134-37. Five thousand peasants went
on a hunger strike to protest the threat that they would only be entitled to transport
five pounds of coca out of their villages. Id. See generally Healey, supra note 26, at
112 (describing the peasant blockades during the Chapare Offensive).
29. LA LUCHA BOLIVIANA, supra note 9, at 134-37; U.S. Losing War, supra note 7,
at 2.
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coca crops.30 As a result, the administration permitted each grower to
sell one twenty-five pound drum of coca per week.3 1
The failure of the Chapare campaign became apparent as cocaine
production and trafficking soon resumed, and quickly attained its previ-
ous levels.3 2 Despite this fact, United States government officials did
not question their original approach to the war on drugs. They contin-
ued to advocate further repressive campaigns as the most effective
strategy to reduce the flow of cocaine from Bolivia to the United
States.33
B. OPERATION BLAST FURNACE
On April 8, 1986, President Ronald Reagan issued a secret directive
declaring that drug trafficking constituted a threat to United States na-
tional security.34 The president's directive immediately affected Boliv-
ian repression efforts. From April 26 to May 6, 1986, the UMOPAR
and United States military forces conducted joint maneuvers in the
Santa Cruz and Cochabamba regions in preparation for the United
States-Bolivian Joint Operation Blast Furnace (Operation Blast
Furnace) .
Operation Blast Furnace was designed to lower the market price of
the coca leaf by destroying cocaine laboratories, thus reducing the de-
mand for raw coca.36 On July 18, 1986, Bolivian troops, aided by
American pilots, moved into the Beni, Chapare, and Santa Cruz re-
30. LA LucHA BOLVIANA, supra note 9, at 134-37; U.S. Losing War, supra note 7,
at 2.
31. U.S. Losing War, supra note 7, at 2; interview with Eudoro Barrientos, at a
trade union leaders' meeting in Villa Tunari (May 29, 1990). Eudoro Barrientos, a
head cocaleros trade union leader from Villanueva recalls that the army, in spite of the
government's entitlement, had barred most of the cocaleros, including himself, from
moving coca out of their villages. Id.
32. Meeting with Jorge Alderette, Undersecretary of Social Defense during the
Paz-Estenssorro administration (Dec. 9, 1989); interview with Eudoro Barrientos,
supra note 31.
33. After the sending of troops for Operation Blast Furnace, enforcement was
boosted by setting up a new course for training the UMOPAR. Interview with Robert
Gelbard, United States Ambassador to Bolivia (Sept. 13, 1989). Moreover, in Annex
III of the 1990 Cartagena Agreement between the United States, Colombia, Peru, and
Bolivia, Bolivia made a commitment to engage the army in drug enforcement.
34. A. TREBACH, Tim GREAT DRUG WAR 170 (1987).
35. Commander Ricardo Lopez and Jorge Vazquez, Gendaramerla Naclonal Ar-
gentina, Special Internal Report (1988) (unpublished report) [hereinafter
Gendarameria Nacional Argentina].
36. Id. at 22.
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gions. Before the troops arrived, however, the traffickers deserted all
the drug processing labs, and the troops found no narcotics.
3 7
Military experts blamed the failure of the "Americanized" enforce-
ment techniques38 on three factors. First, information was handled
poorly.39 Information about the operation leaked and aroused resistance
from sensitized local politicians.40 The international press reported the
operation as an abuse of the United States' financial power over the
Bolivian government that undermined the country's institutional life.41
Second, because drug traffickers could easily identify the aircraft used
in the maneuvers, they anticipated the troop movements.42 Third, vary-
ing conceptions about operational procedures caused rifts among the
United States Special Forces, the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), and the Bolivian UMOPAR. Experts attributed these
conflicts to the different training of police and military officers whose
duties overlapped, and the resulting differences in the forces' enforce-
ment methods.43
Official sources in the United States did not admit that Operation
Blast Furnace failed. 44 The Reagan administration, however, responded
to local public outrage by making the United States military presence
37. Facts on File, World News Digest, Sept. 5, 1986, at 660. At the time, the
Bolivian planning minister had expressed disappointment that it had taken the U.S.
troops four days after landing to begin the raids. Id. During this time, the major drug
traffickers fled the country. Id.
38. See Sharpe, The Drug War: Going After Supply, 30 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD-
IES & WORLD AFF. 77 (1988) (discussing attempted Americanization of anti-drug op-
erations by providing Latin America with funds, training, and equipment).
39. See Lernoux, Cocaine Trade is Scorching the Jungle: Growing the Drug Brings
Money - And With It Violence and Ecological Damage, NEWSDAY, Jan. 1, 1989, at 1
(stating that in 1986 U.S. troops were sent to Bolivia without the knowledge or consent
of the Bolivian Congress). According to some accounts, even the Bolivian president did
not know about the raid. Operation Blast Furnace was a failure because the major
traffickers were tipped off in advance, and therefore only a few peasants were rounded
up.
40. Facts on File, supra note 37, at 660. Neighboring countries expressed concern
at allowing troops into Bolivia. Opposition Members of the Bolivian Congress and the
Main Labor Federation, the Bolivian Workers Central, had strongly criticized the
move.
41. Interview with Ernest Machicado, Bolivian congressman (May 25, 1990); inter-
view with Roger Cortez, former congressman and presidential candidate (Jan. 1,
1990).
42. Interview with Luncio General Anez, commander of the UMOPAR, air force
pilots, and navy personnel (May 31, 1990); interview with Victor Chapare, ex-cocaine
transporter (Jan. 16, 1990).
43. Gendarameria Nacional Argentina, supra note 35.
44. We Gain, They Lose, L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1986, pt. 5, at 4. Although adminis-
tration officials, such as Edwin Meese III, claimed the campaign was a success, others
questioned its effectiveness in the long run. Once the U.S. troops left, there was nothing
to stop the cocaine traders from starting their operations again.
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in Bolivia less conspicuous. The Bush administration has continued this
policy.
C. THE HUANCHACA INCIDENT
During May 1986, retired UMOPAR Colonel Ariel Coca-Aguirre
announced that drug traffickers had built sizeable hydrochloride labo-
ratories and an airfield in the Huanchaca where air traffic could be
constantly monitored. Despite Coca-Aguirre's reputed connections to a
cocaine syndicate from Santa Cruz de la Sierra,'45 the DEA and the
UMOPAR seriously considered his report. On August 3, a DEA air-
craft ferried Coca-Aguirre and UMOPAR officers on a reconnaissance
flight over the laboratories in the Huanchaca region to corroborate the
report.48
In September 1986, Noel Kempff-Mercado, a well known Bolivian
botanist, and his team of three flew into the lush tropical Huanchaca
region of Santa Cruz on an environmental and botanical research tour.
While reports continued of large scale cocaine traffic in the area four
months earlier, the group proceeded. When the expedition landed, men
with automatic weapons captured the scientists and killed two of them
immediately. The survivors fled to the bushes where a gang member
assassinated one of them. A private aircraft pilot rescued Spanish bota-
nist Vicente Castello, the remaining member of the expedition, who hid
in the jungle for almost sixteen hours.
47
There are a number of uncertainties surrounding the Huanchaca in-
cident. Despite rumors that an armed gang protected the cocaine hy-
drochloride laboratories, the Ministry of the Interior and the
UMOPAR did nothing to thwart the illegal activity in the Huanchaca
or to stop Kempff-Mercado's trip to the region. Coca-Aguirre's motives
for reporting the illegal activities in the Huanchaca remain obscure as
suspicions about his involvement in the drug trade appear to be well
grounded. As a result of the Huanchaca incident, the United States
arrested Coca-Aguirre's partner, Lindenberg, a United States citizen,
45. See J. DUNKERLEY, supra note 12, at 328 (stating that although publicly linked
to the cocaine trade, Colonel Ariel Coca-Aguirre served as minister of education in the
Garcia-Meza regime).
46. Testimony of Ariel Coca-Aguirre before a Bolivian congressional committee
(Sept. 13, 1989); interview with Roger Cortez, supra note 9; see testimony of
UMOPAR Colonel Ramirez before a Bolivian congressional investigative commission
(Sept. 15, 1989) (corroborating Coca-Aguirre's report of drug activity in Huanchaca).
47. Interview with Hugo Cochamanidis, director of the Direccion de la Hoja Coca
under Paz-Zamora (May 24, 1990).
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and charged him with cocaine trafficking. 8 The motive behind the
DEA's and UMOPAR's behavior after the assassinations, however, is
also in question. Although the authorities knew immediately that the
expedition failed to return to its base, the UMOPAR and the DEA
waited four days before investigating the Huanchaca plateau by heli-
copter.49 By the time they arrived, only vestiges of the dismantled refin-
eries and an empty encampment remained. 50 Documents written in
Spanish, English, and Portuguese found scattered at the site indicated
the transnational character of the traffickers' network.
51
The Bolivian Congress immediately established a committee to inves-
tigate the Huanchaca incident. Although the DEA agents refused to
testify, citing diplomatic immunity, United States Embassy personnel
in Bolivia submitted a report to justify the DEA's response to the
Huanchaca incident. According to an Embassy spokesman, the DEA
was unable to respond immediately after the incident because the only
available helicopter needed a new battery.52
Active members of the Bolivian congressional investigative commit-
tee received death threats to deter them from further pursuing the in-
vestigation. Shortly after the commission submitted its report to the
Bolivian House, two men on a motorcycle assassinated Congressman
Edmundo Salazar in his hometown of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.53
Salazar was one of the most conspicuous sponsors of the probe.
The Huanchaca incident is one of the darkest anomalies in the con-
temporary story of the drug war in Bolivia. While such violence is com-
mon in Colombia or Peru, it is unusual in Bolivia. Violence connected
to the Huanchaca incident still occurs today.54 In January 1990, offi-
48. See Bolivian Congress Draft Resolution of Oct. 1986 (copy on file with author)
(carrying the signatures of ten congressmen involved in the investigation).
49. After the Kempff-Mercado expedition inadvertently discovered the drug labora-
tory, the Ministry of the Interior planned a military raid on the area. Bridges, Corrup-
tion Hampers Bolivian Antidrug Effort: Payoffs Said to Reach Top Levels of Police,
Wash. Post, Aug. 15, 1987, at A17. Interior Minister Fernando Barthelemy delayed
the raid. Id.
50. Id.
51. Report of Bolivian Congressional Investigative Commission (copy on file with
author).
52. Interview with Hugo Cochamanidis, director of Direccion de la Coca (May 24,
1990); interview with Carlos Arauz, then Director del la Hoja de Coca (Sept. 14,
1989).
53. LA LucA BOLIVIANA, supra note 9, at 154.
54. Peasants Protest Violence in Cochabamba (Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Sept. 22, 1989); de Onis, Bolivia Unions, Leftists Decry U.S. Role in Drug
Raids, L.A. Times, July 20, 1986, at 22; Bolivia Coca Growers are Said to Ease Siege,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1986, at 6.
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cials and media investigators in Bolivia claimed that cocaine hydrochlo-
ride production in the Huanchaca area was greater than ever.""
The Huanchaca incident is an example of the unreliability of drug
enforcement agencies in Bolivia and the extent to which bribery and
corruption affect the efforts of the drug control agencies. The DEA's
presence did nothing to enhance the performance of the UMOPAR.
Rather, both Bolivian and U.S. forces demonstrated that they were un-
able to perform efficiently to eliminate well-known drug processing fa-
cilities and protect the lives of innocent bystanders.
D. THE CHAPARE REVOLT56
Until mid-1988, engineers from Direccion de Reconversion Agricola
(DIRECO), the technical Bolivian bureau in charge of coca eradication
and substitution, used herbicides despite the government's pledge to the
peasants that it would not use chemicals to destroy coca. 17 The use of
herbicides caused severe unrest among coca growers. Peasants alleged
that DEA officials in the Chapare instructed the DIRECO staff to use
the herbicides.58
The turmoil created by the use of these herbicides escalated. Union-
ized growers in the Chapare became openly hostile toward DIRECO,
the UMOPAR, and United States advisers in the Cochabamba region.
A belligerent campaign, organized by Julio Rocha,59 a top union
leader, started with road blocks, followed by an invasion of the
UMOPAR outpost of Villa Tunari on June 27, 1988.0 According to
official sources, four campesinos died in the clash and two others were
reported missing.6 Eyewitnesses to the clash, trade union leaders, local
journalists, and politicians all claim that at least twenty more unarmed
peasants drowned in a nearby river while attempting to escape an at-
tack by the UMOPAR and the DEA.6 2 Guillermo Bedregal-Gutierrez,
the foreign minister of Bolivia at the time, claimed that the peasants
55. Interview with Elva Morales, journalist, in Chochabamba (Jan. 17, 1990); in-
terview with Enrique Valverde, supra note 18.
56. Government Against Herbicides in Coca Eradication (Foreign Broadcast Infor-
mation Service, June 17, 1988).
57. LA Luca. BOLiVIANA, supra note 9, at 18.
58. Government Against Herbicides in Coca Eradication, supra note 56.
59. Interview with Elva Morales, supra note 55; interview with Roger Cortez,
supra note 41.
60. Government on a Collision Course With Coca Growers, ANDEAN Focus, June
1988, at 7.
61. Details on Clash (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, June 29, 1988); Res-
olution on DEA Expulsion (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, June 29, 1988).
62. Interview with Roger Cortez, in La Paz (Jan. 9, 1990); interview with Elva
Morales, supra note 55.
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proceeded to forcibly occupy the DEA headquarters, 63 but this is
unconfirmed.
The turmoil demonstrated that whether driven by cocaine organiza-
tions 4 or their own sectoral interests, growers would not surrender
their coca crops without fierce resistance. While the peasants left the
UMOPAR barracks shortly after the violence ended, active hostilities
ceased only after the government promised to limit its original eradica-
tion plan. 5 On July 19, 1988, the Bolivian Congress passed drug legis-
lation that made the use of defoliants and herbicides illegal in Bolivia.00
This law restricted the means of eradication to inefficient manual pro-
cedures. Thus, coca growers have demonstrated that as an organized
force, they have enough political power to influence and restrain the
Bolivian government.
Although the Paz-Estenssoro administration, which took office in
1985, was more dedicated to fighting the drug war than the previous
Siles administration, it also found itself caught between United States
diplomatic pressure and a force of organized campesinos. Instead of
eradicating seventy percent of the coca crops, as advocated by the
United States, the Paz-Estenssoro administration lowered the target to
fifty percent.67 The amount expected to be eliminated is actually much
lower. To ease tensions at home, Paz-Estenssoro's foreign minister,
Bedregal-Gutierrez, appealed to the Reagan administration to allow a
more "flexible" policy in order to avoid social conflicts with produc-
ers.68 Bedregal's appeal illustrates the Paz-Estenssoro administration's
lack of the necessary coercive power to stage a drastic policy to sub-
stantially reduce coca crops, even where such a policy was needed to
obtain United States aid. There is no indication that the current Paz-
Zamora administration will be more successful.69
63. LA LucHA BOLIVIANA, supra note 9, at 270.
64. Paz-Estenssoro's officials accused Rocha of having close connections with the
drug traffickers. Anibal Aguilar, Undersecretary for Alternative Development in Paz-
Estenssoro's administration, formally accused Julio Rocha of being involved in drug
trafficking.
65. Interview with Jorge Alderete, supra note 32; interview with Eudoro Bar-
rientos, in Villa Tunari (May 25, 1990).
66. Law No. 1008 of July 1988.
67. U.S. vs. Coca Farmers, ANDEAN NEWSL. Sept. 12, 1988, at 1.
68. Id.; Government To Ask U.S. To Change Coca Demands (Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, July 29, 1988); Tyler, Drug Plan Snag For Bolivia, Financial
Times (London), June 25, 1987, at 4; address by Dr. Guillermo Bedregal, Foreign
Minister of Bolivia, National Press Club Conference (Oct. 3, 1988).
69. Interview with UMOPAR captain Ayala, in Chimore (May 29, 1990); inter-
view with NAU official Gustagvo, in Chimore (May 28, 1990).
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E. THE SANTA ANA DE YACUMA INCIDENT
In early 1989, the UMOPAR and its DEA advisers flew by helicop-
ter into Santa Ana de Yacuma in the Beni, where the DEA had spot-
ted the two most notorious drug traffickers in Bolivia: Jorge Roca, also
known as Techo de Paja, and Ali Parada.70 The traffickers fired at the
UMOPAR as they landed. When the UMOPAR fired back and shot
two adversaries, the gang distributed arms among the villagers to resist
the police raid. Soldiers from a naval base a few kilometers north of the
village then approached the location and opened fire upon the
UMOPAR personnel. As the shootout expanded, it became a confusing
battle between the Leopardos and a combination of naval forces, drug
traffickers, and villagers. After the UMOPAR killed two villagers, the
rest of the villagers joined the battle en masse.7 1 The outnumbered Le-
opardos retreated to find shelter at the naval outpost where they had
been attacked earlier.
There is evidence that United States forces played an active part in
this incident. Hugo Duque, an Ecuadoran United States Air Force of-
ficer, sustained minor injuries while allegedly shooting at the villagers
from a helicopter. Duque was ferried to the Belgian hospital in Cocha-
bamba where he received special medical attention for a scratch on his
temple. 2 Upon his release from the hospital he was evacuated to either
the United States or La Paz.7 3 Some UMOPAR personnel with much
more serious injuries were simply taken to the infirmary in the naval
outpost.
The naval officer who initiated the attack upon the UMOPAR and
their United States allies claimed that he thought a foreign force was
invading Bolivia. It is unlikely, however, that the court probing the
Santa Ana incident believed him. Rather, news circulated in the region
that the UMOPAR had executed a wounded peasant, creating specula-
tion that the officer fired to defend the drug trade or to protect peas-
ants' lives, or both.74 The incident in Santa Ana de Yacuma strongly
suggests that the United States Embassy's plan to permanently engage
the Bolivian army and United States Special Forces in the drug war
70. Interview with a UMOPAR officer who participated in the episode, in Chimore
(May 29, 1990); interview with Enrique Valverde, supra note 18; interview with Elva
Morales, supra note 55.
71. Interview with Elva Morales, supra note 55; interview with Enrique Valverde,
(May 4, 1990).
72. Interview with a Paraguayan nurse who ushered Duque to the ward, at the
Hospital Clinica Belga (Jan. 15, 1990).
73. Interview with Elva Morales, supra note 55.
74. Interview with Roger Cortez, supra note 41.
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will complicate and aggravate enforcement in Bolivia, rather than im-
prove it. New actors engaging in drug enforcement probably will add
their own conflicting interests to an already complex situation.
F. SUMMARY
The 1984 Chapare Offensive, the failure of Operation Blast Furnace,
the Huanchaca incident, the 1988 Chapare revolt, and the Santa Ana
de Yacuma incident all illustrate that drug enforcement attempts in
Bolivia have failed to produce any positive results. The 1984 Chapare
Offensive had no lasting impact on drug eradication efforts. Rather, the
peasant protests and demonstrations caused government officials to is-
sue licenses that allowed the peasants to continue selling coca. Opera-
tion Blast Furnace was planned and executed for the purpose of de-
stroying drug processing laboratories. When Bolivian troops arrived at
their targeted areas they found that the laboratories had already been
relocated. The failure of government forces to take action against a
well-known laboratory in the Huanchaca region resulted in the deaths
of Noel Kempff-Mercado and two of his fellow scientists. The 1988
Chapare Revolt created a further obstacle for drug enforcement per-
sonnel. The peasant revolts forced the Bolivian Congress to outlaw the
use of herbicides on coca crops. The efforts of the DEA in Santa Ana
de Yacuma were a futile attempt to capture well-known drug traffick-
ers, that only resulted in a confusing battle between UMOPAR person-
nel, DEA officers, Bolivian naval forces, and peasants. These incidents
exemplify the failure of the war strategy and make it clear that the
failures are not a consequence of any deficiency in resources. Indeed,
even the addition of foreign enforcement agents did not improve the
situation. The war approach to the Bolivian drug problem will never
attain results that either the United States or Bolivia desire.
II. DECENTRALIZATION OF THE COCAINE INDUSTRY
IN BOLIVIA
After the mid-1980's, the relationship between coca growers and co-
caine businessmen changed significantly, making efforts to create effec-
tive policies for curbing the production of coca and cocaine paste more
difficult. While enforcement efforts in the Chapare continued to fail,
the cocaine paste industry became, in large part, a "cottage industry"
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run by the peasants of the Chapare. Today, cocaine paste production is
as widespread as it is unsophisticated.7
5
There are two main reasons for the "decentralization" 76 of cocaine
paste production: First, the government's focus on small cocaine paste
producers has forced small farmers to begin producing cocaine. De-
mand for coca declined as a consequence of enforcement actions
against small producers. As a result the price of the coca leaves no
longer yields enough money to support a farmer, driving many peasants
who were otherwise reluctant to engage in risky farming operations to
begin producing cocaine.
Second, traffickers from Santa Cruz and the Beni have realized the
benefits of passing the burden of paste production and transportation
from the large trade centers to the peasants in the Chapare. Small
growers began stomping their own leaf into paste, smuggling the neces-
sary sulfuric acid and kerosene into the Chapare, and purchasing
chemicals at increased costs in the local market. As a result, Bolivian
drug enforcement officials became concerned about the participation of
previously innocent peasant coca growers in the lower echelons of illicit
cocaine trafficking networks."
United States officials in Bolivia are finally aware of the dynamics of
the situation now that most coca growers are also small drug producers.
They realize that enforcement created a strong incentive to produce
drugs instead of other crops. Paradoxically, enforcement attempts have
led an even greater segment of the population to constantly violate the
drug laws.
75. Rural Leader on Reduction in Cocaine Production (Foreign Broadcast Infor-
mation Service, Sept. 14, 1989). Plastic sheets are used both to create a floor on which
coca leaves are trampled to make cocaine paste, and to protect the paste from the dirt
that drifts in with the breeze. Paper, usually toilet paper, is used to dry the paste. In
1988, President Paz-Estenssoro's Undersecretary for Coca Eradication led this author
inside a police checkpoint shed- on the road from Cochabamba to the Chapare. The
variety of confiscated items collected by the authorities included: gasoline tanks, empty
drums, plastic sheets, toilet paper, car batteries, and kerosene lanterns. Some growers
have their own cement secaderos (drying platforms); the rest dry their leaf on the road
in front of their houses.
76. R. Cortez, Informe Parlamentario del Caso Huanchaca, Oct. 27, 1986 (unpub-
lished Bolivian Congressional Commission Report).
77. The villages of Sinahota, Ivirgarzama, Valle Sajta, and Eterazama are a few of
the notable points in the Chapare where peasants transport their cocaine sulphate de-
spite the widespread presence of enforcement officers.
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III. U.S. AND BOLIVIAN REACTIONS TO DEFEAT IN THE
"WAR ON DRUGS"
In September 1989, Ambassador Robert Gelbard privately an-
nounced that there would be a change in the enforcement strategy by
late 1989.78 The new strategy would concentrate on cocaine refineries
and large drug transactions. In addition, he discussed the construction
of a new intelligence center in the Beni region of the Amazon to make
the new strategy possible. 9 With more accurate intelligence data, drug
enforcement operations could target identified airfields and large labo-
ratories, rather than allow the UMOPAR and DEA to squander time
and fuel targeting small-scale coca paste producers.80
As a part of the new drug policy envisioned by United States offi-
cials, drug enforcement agents will monitor thousands of small produc-
ers.8' To implement the new policy, the United States government ad-
vocates the regular involvement of the Bolivian army in anti-narcotics
operations, despite the general fear that the army will become as in-
volved in the drug trade as the UMOPAR.82 While the U.S. Ambassa-
dor does not discount this apprehension, he maintains that the best so-
lution is to escalate enforcement efforts.83 Consistent with this policy,
United States Army leaders advocate an extension of the Special
Forces beyond the limited role of training local agents. Colonel Wil-
liam Depalo of the United States army recently announced that Boliv-
ian army officers will receive training to combat drug trafficking at the
School of the Americas in Georgia.84 In addition, the United States
plans to join the Bolivian army and the UMOPAR in cocaine eradica-
tion operations. This move directly contradicts prior assertions of Presi-






84. Fuerza Anti-Droga Libero a Narco Implicado en Casa Huanchaca, ULTIMA
HORA, Jan. 19, 1990, at 9. The School of the Americas trains officers of military and
authoritarian regimes in specialties such as "interrogation techniques" and "domestic
intelligence." L. SCHOULTZ, NATIONAL SECURITY AND UNITED STATES POLICY To-
WARD LATIN AMERICA 167 (1987). Argentines, Guatemalans, Chileans, and officers
from other dictatorial countries in the region exchanged experiences with their U.S.
colleagues. Id. The school was based in Panama between 1977 and 1984 as a result of
a bilateral agreement between Panama and the United States. Id. According to the
original agreement, the school would operate in Panama for ten years. Id. The school
left Panama in 1984, however, as new democracies spread out in Latin America. Id.
Since 1985, the school has been set up provisionally in Fort Benning, Georgia. Id. To-
day, most Latin Americans view the school as an anathema. Id. The school, for exam-
ple, has taught the armies to perform torture efficiently. Id.
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dent Paz-Zamora that the Bolivian army's intervention in the drug war
was unnecessary because of the existence of the UMOPAR.8 5
As of January 1990, only a dozen soldiers from the United States
Army's Special Forces remained in the Chapare. These troops share a
barracks compound in Chimore with the United States Border Patrol,
the DEA, and the UMOPAR. The Special Forces must confine their
mission to training the Leopardos in jungle warfare rather than actual
field operations."6 The Border Patrol instructs the local police at cus-
toms checkpoints where drugs, chemicals,°and drug processing tools are
smuggled in and out of the Chapare region.
In addition to its basic intelligence duties, the DEA advises and
largely commands the UMOPAR in its operational maneuvers.8 7 To
transport drug enforcement personnel into the jungle, the Bolivian air
force uses six helicopters on loan from the United States.8 Although
these helicopters display the Bolivian flag, agreements with the United
States require that they fly with at least one DEA official on board.8
The Bolivian Air Force and Navy play only a secondary role in anti-
drug law enforcement.9 0 The Air Force's primary role is to transport
85. Before meeting with President Bush on May 8, 1990, President Paz-Zamora
declared that he was against calling the army into the "war on cocaine" because such a
step would bring about uncalled for violence. Paz said he could not adopt a measure his
country did not need. In May 1990, Minister Guillermo Capobianco declared to the
press that the army was not necessary. He stated that the UMOPAR will never be
surpassed by the traffickers and that, therefore, there was no need to appeal to the
army.
86. See Klare, Scenario For A Quagmire: Fighting Drugs With The Military, THE
NATION, Jan. 1, 1990, at 8 (discussing U.S. training programs for counter-insurgency
tactics). Since 1988, DEA agents have been training South American forces on drug
raids. Id. It should be noted that Administration officials have left the door open for
future troop commitments. Id. When questioned about this, William Bennett, the na-
tion's drug czar at that time, refused to take this option off the table. Id.
87. See Coast Guard Specialists Operating Inside Bolivia, U.P.I., Nov. 28, 1989
(explaining how specially trained Coast Guard units are aiding Bolivian drug enforce-
ment agents in their anti-narcotics campaigns). In 1989, the U.S. Coast Guard formed
the Drug Interdiction Assist Team, which trains its members in guerrilla warfare tech-
niques. Id. This group is an offshoot of Operation Snowcap, a joint agency effort link-
ing the Coast Guard, DEA, and State Department with South American governments
such as Bolivia. Id.
88. See Bolivia Receives Two U.S. Helicopters, U.P.I., Aug. 28, 1989 (discussing
transportation facilities for Bolivian drug enforcers).
89. Coast Guard Specialists Operating Inside Bolivia, supra note 87.
90. See Traiwor, In Bolivian Drug War, A Question of Will, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29,
1989, at 22 (noting that apart from the small navy and air force detachments that
assist the police, the Bolivian armed forces are involved in combating drugs). The army
is divided over how involved it should be, because the drug issue is not considered
important by many Bolivians. Id. Recently, however, the Bolivian army has become
more active in the drug war. Id.
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UMOPAR and DEA officers.91 According to Ambassador Gelbard, Air
Force pilots are remarkably efficient in managing Huey helicopters.
92
The Bolivian Navy is responsible for monitoring ports and boat traffic
on the wide Amazon rivers in the eastern lowlands and ferrying person-
nel in and out of the Beni, where the lack of roads limits land access.
The Army's drug enforcement role is generally limited to a few large
scale operations such as the takeover of the Chapare in October 1984.1
3
Despite the importance of the UMOPAR as the local drug law en-
forcer in the joint United States-Bolivian plan, the organization is ill
equipped due to the interference of the zealous Bolivian military forces.
In an effort to maintain its traditional clout, the Army induced Bolivia
and the United States to limit UMOPAR resources to a level lower
than the Army's.9 As a result, while the UMOPAR received privileged
training from the DEA, the Special Forces, and the Border Patrol, its
operating capacity was handicapped because its obsolete World War II
carbines and precarious communications equipment hindered the exe-
cution of assignments. 5 Patrols were often unable to communicate with
one another, and the lack of sophisticated radio equipment impeded
efficient operations against drug traffickers in the mountainous jungle
areas of the Chapare and the Amazon rain forest in both the Beni and
northern Santa Cruz regions.96
The reputation of UMOPAR and DEA agents varies tremendously
in Bolivia. Coca growers in the Chapare charge that the UMOPAR
forces harass and pillage them, often with the support of the DEA.
High ranking interdiction officials complain that these agencies lack ef-
ficacy. '7 These officials claim that the UMOPAR and DEA agents do
91. Id.
92. Interview with Robert Gelbard, supra note 33.
93. See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text (discussing the Chapare
Offensive).
94. Bolivian Military Requests Withdrawal From War on Drugs, 15 DEFENSE3
FOREIGN AFF. WEEKLY 6 (1989). In August 1989, the Bolivian armed forces requested
deactivation from the nation's drug war. Id. The request was due to the fact that
UMOPAR is under police, rather than military control. Id.
95. See Painter, Bolivian Struggles in War on Drugs, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept.
6, 1989, at 6. (discussing the UMOPAR's lack of resources). According to one
UMOPAR official, his unit was fighting with Ml rifles from the Korean War. Id.
Meanwhile, the drug traffickers had access to the latest submachine guns. Id. Further-
more, UMOPAR lacks radar facilities to track light planes crossing Bolivia's 3,100
miles of borders. Id. The one radar station based in La Paz covers only one-seventh of
the border and does not include the eastern regions of Beni and Santa Cruz, where
most of the drug ferrying occurs. Id.
96. Interview with Major Arana, UMOPAR, in Villa Tunari (Sept. 1989).
97. Interview with Elva Morales, in Cochabamba (Jan. 15, 1990); interview with
two members of the San Miguel's Cocaleros Union (Sept. 16, 1989).
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not deal with the substantial cocaine transactions that take place right
in front of them on the other side of the barbed wired outposts of
Chimore, Villa Tunari, and Ivirgarzama. Enrique Valverde, local head
of the Bolivian State Department's Narcotics Assistance Unit (NAU)
in Cochabamba, and Carlos Arauz, director of the Bolivian Coca In-
terdiction Office during Paz-Estenssoro's administration, reported, for
example, that Arauz personally arrested an aircraft pilot who made
two daily flights at specified times to collect basic coca paste. The air-
strip where the airplane landed is located no more than three miles
away from the Chimore compound. Although Valverde consistently re-
ported these flights to the UMOPAR and the DEA, they took no ac-
tion. 8 These types of incidents illustrate the incompetence of Bolivian
and United States drug enforcement officials who fail to raise concern
in the high political circles of La Paz.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The failure of U.S. and Bolivian drug repression efforts is the result
of several factors that are easy to identify but difficult to suppress.
These factors include: widespread opposition to drug eradication pro-
grams by the Bolivian peasants; corruption among government leaders,
inefficient handling of information by the UMOPAR, the DEA, and
the Bolivian military; the failure of U.S. and Bolivian government
forces to respond quickly to reports of drug trafficking; and rivalry be-
tween the UMOPAR and the Bolivian military. It also shows that U.S.
enforcement agents in Bolivia pursue goals other than winning the war
on drugs. Thus far, drug policy has centered around destroying drug
processing laboratories, to reduce the demand for raw coca, and crop
substitution programs, 99 while in practice enforcement has persecuted
coca stompers and small time brokers. The United States and Bolivia
need to reevaluate their policy and implement programs that will ad-
dress the core issues facing the Bolivian government. They must de-
velop comprehensive programs that avoid taking away the peasants'
livelihood without providing alternative ways for the peasants to pro-
vide for themselves and their families. Without the support of the peas-
ants, the drug traffickers have no means of providing coca leaves to the
drug processing laboratories, and ultimately to the drug consumers in
98. Interview with Carlos Arauz, supra note 52; interview with NAU agents in
Bolivia (Sept. 16, 1989).
99. See Craig, supra note 4, at 106 (referring to bilateral agreements between
Washington and La Paz which were intended to combat the drug trade by instituting
drug control and crop substitution programs).
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Bolivia and abroad. The peasants have proven to be a formidable force
in the drug war. The only way that the Bolivian government can re-
solve the cocaine problem is to institute programs that take into consid-
eration the needs of the peasants.
A. CROP SUBSTITUTION
Crop substitution programs alone will never be sufficient to decrease
the incentive for the Bolivian peasants to grow and sell coca leaves.
Coca provides the most profitable business to small farmers because
coca grows easily and produces a valuable traditional crop. Any crop
substitution program will require financial subsidization to induce
farmers to participate. The governments of the United States and Bo-
livia should develop a program that includes direct payments for crops
other than coca, and assistance in transporting and marketing these
crops.
B. IMPLEMENT NEW REGULATIONS
The Bolivian legislature could implement laws that would protect
peasants who grow a limited amount of coca, but prevent peasants
from processing the coca into cocaine paste. Paste production involves
the use of chemicals such as kerosene and sulfuric acid. Stringent regu-
lations on the sale of chemicals that are used in paste processing would
prevent many of the peasants, who now find paste production to be
relatively cheap and easy, from becoming involved in the more ad-
vanced aspects of the drug trade.
C. PROSECUTION OF VIOLATORS
People who are arrested on drug violations are often not prosecuted
vigorously.100 The Bolivian judiciary should allocate additional re-
sources to prosecuting those accused of drug offenses. The Bolivian leg-
islature should also implement regulations that allow for increased op-
portunities for drug traffickers to be extradited to the United States for
trial.
D. INCREASED MONITORING OF U.S. FUNDS
The U.S. and Bolivian governments should implement procedures to
track the funds sent by the United States for drug eradication pro-
100. See Bolivian Army Carries Drug War to Hills, supra note 1, at A22 (relating
an incident in which two suspected drug traffickers were arrested, but later released
because of lack of evidence against them).
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grams. By forcing expenditures to be approved by U.S. embassy per-
sonnel, it is possible to prevent the money from ending up in the pock-
ets of government and military officials. The United States should also
monitor the projects that involve U.S. funding, and only continue those
projects that are successful.
V. CONCLUSION
A. THE U.S. SIDE
Repressing a growing number of legally defined drug offensives be-
comes an impossible endeavor because agencies that deal with it are
either too small to be effective or too big to be controlled by the state.
Regular police forces are not designed to manage the increased num-
ber, perhaps three-fold or even more, of law breakers in the Americas.
If, however, enforcement agencies are swollen to meet the imposing
numbers of drug offenders, they become too large to remain loyal to
their targeted goals as defined by top political officials. Thus, experi-
ence shows that in Bolivia, U.S. drug enforcement related agencies
have developed their own strategies in the pursuance of their sectoral
interests. The deregulation of drug legislation demands serious consid-
eration. The task will require a sizeable dose of imagination and
creativity.
B. THE BOLIVIAN SIDE
"War" implies that there is a winner and a loser, not that there
might be a tradeoff of interests. There are several factors contributing
to the complexity of interests that make the war approach to the drug
problem in Bolivia inappropriate. A lack of sufficiently coercive state
institutions has resulted in an illegal sector too large to be excluded
from joint, concerted policies. As Bolivia's economic and political life
centers around the cocaine trade, it has been impossible to achieve the
consensus necessary to produce the economic and political shifts neces-
sary to reduce cocaine production. Only by implementing new legisla-
tion that addresses the needs of the peasants and providing new eco-
nomic incentives will the Bolivian government be able to fight the drug
problem and win the support and respect of all sectors of Bolivian
society.
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